International Capital Flows and the Frankel-Dooley-Mathieson Puzzle by Shigeyuki Hamori
International Capital Flows and the
Frankel-Dooley-Mathieson Puzzle 
Shigeyuki Hamori
Faculty of Economics, Kobe University
Abstract
Frankel et al (1986) pointed out that industrialized countries have larger saving rate
coefficients than do developing countries in the framework of Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. This
is referred to as the Frankel-Dooley-Mathieson puzzle in this paper. This paper extends past
analyses by incorporating indices of a domestic institutional and policy environment.
Applying the resulting model to Sub-Saharan African countries, saving rate coefficients
larger than those previously imagined were obtained. These results are consistent with the
reality of capital regulations and other factors resulting in low capital flows in developing
countries.
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the groundbreaking work of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), the measurement of 
the freedom of international capital flows has been a central research theme in the field 
of international economics and has captured the interest of many researchers. 
  In the absence of international capital flows, borrowing from abroad cannot 
compensate for shortages in domestic saving. Consequently, shortages in domestic 
saving lead to shortages in domestic investment. Conversely, when domestic saving 
increases, the entirety of the saving increase is directed to domestic investment. In a 
closed economy, therefore, domestic saving and domestic investment are highly 
positively correlated.   
  In the case of economies in which capital flows into or out of a country freely, 
borrowing from abroad can compensate for shortages in domestic saving. Therefore, 
declines in domestic saving do not necessarily lead to declines in domestic investment. 
From the opposite perspective, increases in domestic saving do not necessarily flow into 
domestic investment; they may be directed abroad in search of higher investment return 
opportunities. Hence, in an open economy, domestic saving and domestic investment 
are not highly positively correlated.
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  To empirically test the above relationship between saving and investment rates, 





αβ =+ .  
 
Here,  I
Y   is the investment rate and  S
Y , the saving rate. If international capital flows 
are completely unrestrained, the saving rate coefficient,  β , should approach zero. In 
contrast, if there are no international capital flows, nearly all increases in saving would 
be used for domestic investment, and  β   would approach one. 
  Feldstein and Horioka (1980) used data from 16 industrialized nations 
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) for the period from 1960 to 1974 to analyze the relationship between 
saving and investment rates, and obtained a  β  estimate close to one. This result was 
clearly in contrast with the hypothesis that capital flows are unrestrained and gave rise 
to the “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.” The research of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) gained 
significant attention and has been examined by numerous researchers. Subsequent 
research (Feldstein, 1983; Murphy, 1984; Obstfeld, 1986; Golub, 1990; Feldstein and 
Bachetta, 1991; Tesar, 1991; Obstfeld, 1995) has suggested that results similar to those 
                                                      
1 Each country suffers from not only global shocks but also idiosyncratic shocks. A change in 
global conditions causes a rise and fall in investment opportunities and thus the incentive to 
save. Thus, if all countries are strongly correlated, then the coefficient should still be close to 
one regardless of the degree of international capital flows. However, each country always faces 
idiosyncratic shocks such as natural disasters, political turmoil, ethnic clashes, relaxation of 
regulations, the opening of the market, changes in the educational system, and growth (fall) in 
population. Such idiosyncratic shocks lead to a difference in the expected return of investment 
in each country. Investors diversify their investment not only in domestic markets but also in 
foreign markets and thereby gain more profits.   3
of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) can be obtained for the OECD countries. 
  Aiming to resolve the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, many researchers have 
experimented with various devices, three of which are presented here. The first 
(Obstfeld, 1986; Bayoumi, 1990) was the supplementation of the regression equation 
with a fiscal explanatory variable, shocks to both domestic investment and saving, the 
effect of nontraded commodities, and other factors to lower the regression coefficient 
for domestic saving. The second (Bayoumi and Rose, 1993; Dekle, 1995) was the use of 
cross-selection data for various regions in a country to test the assertions of Feldstein 
and Horioka (1980). The third was an attempt (Coiteux and Olivier, 2000; Ho, 2002) to 
test the results of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) with explicit consideration of the 
nonstationarity of data. 
  This manuscript considers a different perspective—one that has yet to gain 
significant attention—for approaching the problem at hand. This perspective focuses on 
the disparity between the saving-investment correlation in industrialized countries and 
that in developing countries. Frankel et al (1986) clearly showed that industrialized 
countries have larger saving rate coefficients than do developing countries. This finding 
overturned common wisdom because it was believed that open markets made capital 
flows relatively free in industrialized countries. This implied that domestic saving and 
investment were not strongly linked and that the saving rate coefficient should be small. 
In the case of developing countries, a relatively high level of regulation was considered 
to mean that inward and outward capital flows were relatively restricted. In this regard, 
the implication was that domestic saving and investment were strongly linked and that 
the saving rate coefficient should be large. Frankel et al (1986), however, obtained 
results that directly contradicted these assumptions. These were important findings and 
raised the critical question as to why the saving rate coefficients of developing countries 
are small (this issue is henceforth referred to as the “Frankel-Dooley-Mathieson 
puzzle”). 
  This paper adopts a new perspective in attempting to resolve the 
Frankel-Dooley-Mathieson puzzle by considering in its analysis the institutional and 
policy environment. Sustainable economic growth requires a policy environment that 
permits capital accumulation, the acquisition of education and knowledge, technological 
innovation, and macroeconomic stability. In turn, this type of policy environment should 
be supported by factors like protection of intellectual property; highly transparent 
judicial, legislative, and executive systems that allow for the control of corruption; and 
the construction of prudential restrictions that promote the development of a sound, 
stable banking system. Additionally, as factors supporting economic growth, factors 
such as a government capable of smoothly and efficiently implementing economic 
policies and structural reforms; systems for providing and administering infrastructure 
services; and a trading, investment, and competitive environment promoting smooth 
business activity are critical. An effective government; judicial, legislative, and 
executive systems; a financial system; a market environment; and other factors 
supporting economic growth are collectively referred to as an “institutional and policy 
environment.” For economic development, developing countries require not only 
improved macroeconomic development policies but also a sound institutional and policy 
environment. Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Rodrik (2000) performed pioneering 
research that explicitly considered an institutional and policy environment.
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2  Also see Rodrik and Subramanian (2003).   4
  This paper explicitly incorporates this perspective in applying the Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) analytical approach to Sub-Saharan African countries and obtained 
saving rate coefficients larger than those obtained by Frankel et al (1986). These results 
raise the possibility that Frankel et al (1986) obtained spurious values as results. It is 
conceivable, in other words, that in countries with a poor institutional and policy 




2. Empirical Analysis 
2.1 Data 
 
This paper uses annual data for the period 1980 to 2005 for analyses targeting 29 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Specifically, these countries include Angola, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
  The data used include investment rates, saving rates, and composite political, 
financial, and economic risk ratings for a country; these data have been prepared by the 
PRS Group. Investment rates and saving rates were obtained from the publication, 
World Development Indicators (World Bank).
3 Table 1 shows the investment and 
savings in Sub-Saharan African region. As is clear from the table, savings tend to be 
larger than investment in many cases.   
  The PRS Group’s composite political, financial, and economic risk ratings 
(CR ) were calculated as described below: 
 
(2)  0.5( ) CR PR FR ER =+ + . 
 
In this equation, PR denotes political risk; FR , financial risk; and ER, economic 
risk.  PR  represents a country’s political stability on a scale of 0 (highest risk) to 100 
(least risk) and specifically considers government stability, socioeconomic conditions, 
investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, 
religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucracy quality.  FR  represents a country’s ability to pay its way by financing its 
official, commercial, and trade debt obligations, reflecting it on a scale of 0 (highest 
risk) to 50 (least risk). Specifically considered in assessing financial risk are foreign 
debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services (XGS), the current account as a percentage of XGS, net liquidity as months 
of import cover, and exchange rate stability. ER  represents a country’s current 
economic strengths and weaknesses on a scale of 0 (highest risk) to 50 (least risk) and 
specifically considers GDP per capita, real annual GDP growth, the annual inflation rate, 
                                                      
3 Investment rate is the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP, and saving rate is the ratio of 
gross domestic savings to GDP. Both variables are expressed as percentages. Note that gross 
capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) comprises outlays on additions to the 
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. (Source: World Bank 
national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files.)   5
budget balance as a percentage of GDP, and current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP. The  CR   values range from 0 to 100, with larger values reflecting lower risk. 
 
 
2.2 Empirical Models 
 
The following model was used to test the results obtained by Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980). 
 




αβ =+ +,  1, 2, , 1, 2, , iN t T = = LL .  
 
In the above expression,  I  represents domestic investment;  S , domestic saving; Y , 
GDP;  T , number of observations over time; and N , the number of individual 
members in the panel. To explicitly consider country risk, the model was expanded as 
follows. 
 




αβ β β =+ + + +,  1, 2, , 1, 2, , iN t T = = LL .  
 
In the above, country risk is represented by the variable  CR . 
 
 
2.3 Empirical Results 
 
The analysis begins with panel unit root tests of saving rates, investment rates, and 
country risk. In performing a positive analysis, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
issue of the stationarity of variables. As Ho (2002) pointed out, it is possible that saving 
and investment rates are nonstationary. Therefore, prior to estimating equations (3) and 
(4), it was necessary to perform panel unit root tests on each variable to confirm the 
stationarity of each variable. For the present analysis, the LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu) and 
IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin) tests were used (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002; Im, Pesaran and 
Shin, 2003). Deterministic specifications for two cases, one for individual effects and 
individual linear trends and the other for individual effects only were employed for 
these tests. As Table 2 clearly shows, the null hypothesis that each variable has a unit 
root was rejected in most cases.   
  Confirmation that none of the variables had a unit root made it possible to 
proceed with the empirical analysis based on equations (3) and (4). Since the 
explanatory variables for equation (3) were endogenous, it was not appropriate to 
estimate the models using ordinary least squares (OLS). The analysis, therefore, was 
performed using the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
  Table 3 presents the empirical results for equation (3), which describes the 
basic model. A fixed effect model was used to perform the panel data analysis.
4 The 
instrumental variables used are given below: 
 
                                                      
4  We performed the Hausman test and found that the random effect model was rejected.     6
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⎡⎤ = ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
. 
 
Here,  1 z  includes variable values for the previous period; and  2 z , for the previous 
period and two periods prior. 
  As the table clearly shows, the saving rate coefficient,  β , was estimated to be 
positive in both cases, i.e., 0.3869 for  1 z  and 0.3076 for  2 z . In both cases, the 
estimates were statistically significant. From these  β  estimates, it can be seen that 
when the saving rate increases, a portion of the increase tends toward investment, but 
that portion is relatively small. These results are consistent with the empirical results 
Frankel et al (1986) obtained for developing countries. Moreover, the relatively small 
J-statistics—16.5200 for  1 z  and 15.3112 for  2 z —that were obtained indicate that the 
over-identifying restrictions were met. 
  Table 4 presents the fixed effect model estimation results for equation (4), the 
expanded model. The instrumental variables used in this case were as follows. 
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3 z  includes the variable values for the previous period; and  4 z , for the previous 
period and two periods prior. 
  As is clear from the table, the saving rate coefficient,  0 β —at 0.7399 for  3 z  
and 0.7292 for  4 z —is estimated to be positive in both cases. Both values are 
statistically significant. Particularly notable is that the saving rate coefficient estimates 
are larger for equation (4) than for equation (3). In other words, increases in domestic 
saving are directed toward investment at a certain rate, and this rate is higher than the 
expectation. These results indicate the possibility that the results obtained by Frankel et 
al (1986) were spurious values. The product coefficient,  1 β , for country risk and saving 
rate was estimated to be negative and is statistically significant. Therefore, it appears 
that improvements in the domestic institutional and policy environment weaken the 
saving-investment link by promoting international capital flows. The country risk 
coefficient,  2 β , was estimated to be positive and is statistically significant. Therefore, it 
is considered that, at a certain domestic saving rate, savings in a country with a poor 
domestic institutional and policy environment tend to flow abroad, rather than exhibit a 
tendency toward domestic capital accumulation. Further, the low J-statistics of 19.0371 
for  3 z   and 19.5428 for  4 z   indicate that the over-identifying restrictions were met. 
 
 
3. Some Concluding Remarks 
 
If capital flows are free, increases in saving shift from countries with low investment 
returns to those with high investment returns. Consequently, even if the domestic saving 
rate falls, the shortage is compensated for by capital from abroad, and hence, the   7
investment rate cannot decline like the saving rate. However, if capital flows are not 
unrestricted, the flows from abroad cannot compensate for a capital shortage and the 
investment rate will follow the saving rate’s downward movement. In such cases, the 
saving and investment rates are highly correlated.   
  As Frankel et al (1986) pointed out, however, the saving rate coefficient for 
industrialized countries approach one while those for developing countries are low. In 
this paper, this contradiction of ideas surrounding the freedom of capital flows is 
referred to as the Frankel-Dooley-Mathieson puzzle. 
  This paper employed models similar to those used by Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980) to analyze the relationships between saving and investment rates using the panel 
data of Sub-Saharan African countries and found low saving rate coefficients of 
approximately 0.3. These results are consistent with those obtained by Frankel (1986). 
Then, this paper extended past analyses by incorporating indices of a domestic 
institutional and policy environment. Applying the resulting model to Sub-Saharan 
African countries, saving rate coefficients larger than those previously expected were 
obtained. These results are consistent with the reality of capital regulations and other 
factors resulting in low capital flows in developing countries. They also clearly show 
that (i) improvements in a domestic institutional and policy environment weaken the 
saving-investment link by promoting international capital flows and (ii) at a certain 
domestic saving rate, savings in a country with a poor domestic institutional and policy 
environment tend to flow abroad, rather than exhibit a tendency toward domestic capital 
accumulation. 
  Despite its contributions, this paper also has some limitations. For example, a great 
deal of investment in LDC (least-developed countries) may be government-sponsored or may 
come from the World Bank (directly or indirectly). Thus, some portion of investment might not 
come from the international capital market or local savings. The analysis of this problem is left 
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Table 1. Investment and Saving in the Sub-Saharan African Region   
(millions of dollars) 
 
Year    1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Investment 60389  33748  51226  59719  60972  119291 
Saving 81893  48618  60040  51670  71077  126072 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)   
   10
 
Table 2. Panel Unit Root Results 
 
Variable Method  Specification  Test  Statistic  p-value 
        
LLC  (TR and F)  –4.3519  0.000 
 (F)  –4.1339  0.000 
      




 (F)  –4.9133  0.000 
       
       
LLC  (TR and F)  –5.2417  0.000 
 (F)  –5.2059  0.000 
      




 (F)  –4.0245  0.000 
        
        
LLC  (TR and F)  –4.4847  0.000 
 (F)  –3.7982  0.000 
      
IPS  (TR and F)  –2.7850  0.003 
CR  
 (F)  –0.6759  0.250 
        
Note: 
LLC denotes the Levin, Lin and Chu test. 
IPS represents the Im, Pesaran and Shin test. 
(TR and F) indicates the individual effect and individual linear trend. 
(F) indicates the individual effect.  11
 
Table 3. Panel Estimation Results 




αβ =+ +,  1, 2, ; 1, 2, , iN t T = = LL  
 
ˆ β  
SE ( ˆ β ) 
J-Statistic 
  Instrumental Variables 
   
0.3869** 16.5200  1 z  
(0.0362)    
0.3076** 15.3112  2 z  
(0.0248)    
   
Note: 
** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Panel Estimation Results 
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    0 ˆ β       1 ˆ β       2 ˆ β      J-Statistic   Instrumental 
  SE( 0 ˆ β )    SE( 1 ˆ β )    SE( 2 ˆ β )      Variables 
     
  0.7399**    –0.0080*    0.2053**     19.0371        1 z  
  (0.1558)    (0.0032)    (0.0458)     
     
  0.7292**    –0.0083**    0.2070**     19.5428        2 z  
  (0.1313)    (0.0027)    (0.0347)     
     
Note: 
** and * indicate the significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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